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State v. Fields: Felony Murder and Psychological Use of
a Deadly Weapon
At common law all felonies were punishable by death.I It seemed logical to
make any death that occurred during the commission or attempted commission
of a felony first degree murder.2 This result is known as the felony murder rule.
Today, however, most felonies are not punished as severely as murder.3 Recog-
nizing the harshness that the felony murder rule works when applied to killings
associated with many felonies, 4 most jurisdictions have limited the application of
the rule. Some have explicitly restricted the types of felony deaths to which the
rule may be applied.5 Others have punished some felony deaths as second de-
gree murder, and still others classify certain felony deaths as manslaughter. A
few states have followed the Model Penal Code's suggestion7 and abolished the
felony murder rule.8 North Carolina, however, retains felony murder as a first
degree murder offense.9
In 1977 the North Carolina General Assembly amended the felony mur-
der1° clause of North Carolina General Statutes section 14-17 to read "[a] mur-
der which shall be... committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
of any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or
attempted with the use of a deadly weapon, shall be deemed to be murder in the
first degree.""1 In State v. Fields12 the North Carolina Supreme Court faced its
first opportunity to determine the legislative intent behind the "committed or
attempted with the use of a deadly weapon" language. The court concluded that
the general assembly did not intend this language to restrict the types of unspeci-
1. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5, at 207 n.4 (1986). The
common-law felonies, other than murder, were rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem,
and larceny. Id. at 208.
2. Id. at 206.
3. Id. at 207 n.4.
4. Id. at 207; see infra note 45 for examples.
5. See generally 2 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 208-11, 213 (discussing the
typical kinds of restrictions imposed by different states).
6. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment 6, at 31-32 n.78 (Official Draft 1980)
(listing states that divide felony murder offenses into different degrees).
7. Id. at 29. The commentators suggest that a presumption of recklessness and extreme indif-
ference is raised when a death occurs during the commission or attempted commission of certain
felonies instead of using the felony murder rule as "an independent basis for establishing the crimi-
nality of homicide." Id. This change would, in effect, abolish the felony murder rule. Id.
8. For a discussion of the states that have abolished the felony murder rule, see Comment, The
Dillon Dilemma: Finding Proportionate Felony-Murder Punishments, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1299, 1307
n.40 (1984); see also infra note 43 (discussing the four states which have abolished felony murder).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986).
10. Because the statute does not explicitly refer to an offense as "felony murder," the North
Carolina Supreme Court has discouraged use of that term. State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 423, 290
S.E.2d 574, 588 (1982). The clause simply describes one classification of offenses that constitute first
degree murder.
11. Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 407, 407 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986) (emphasis added to show language added)); see infra note 61 for a
statement of the clause.
12. 315 N.C. 191, 337 S.E.2d 518 (1985).
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fled felonies which could form the basis of a felony murder conviction to felonies
actually committed by physical use of a deadly weapon. 13 The court held that
mere possession of a deadly weapon involves a psychological use which is within
the purview of the statute. 14
This Note examines the history of the felony murder rule and its recent
treatment in other states. The Note then examines North Carolina's historical
approach to the rule and analyzes the Fields decision in light of this background.
This Note suggests that the general assembly's 1977 amendment to section 14-
17 is in keeping with the national trend toward limitation of the rule. It also
contends that the North Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of the amend-
ment is consistent with the court's traditional view of felony murder, but con-
cludes that the court's interpretation is too broad in light of the legislature's
attempt to move the scope of the rule away from its common-law roots. This
Note suggests alternative wordings for the felony murder clause of section 14-17
to clear its ambiguity and to better convey legislative intent.
The events in Fields began one February evening in 1983 with defendant,
Anthony Fields, driving his truck around Wake County with two companions,
Norman Collins and Douglas Boney.1 5 The trio drove into the driveway of Er-
nest Carter, parked and got out of the truck. Samuel Fisher, Carter's neighbor,
observed their arrival. Defendant Fields and Boney then went to a storage shed
near the Carter house, opened the shed and removed a chain saw and a maul.16
Meanwhile, Collins was peering through windows into the Carter home.17
Knowing that the Carters were not home, Fisher got his shotgun and drove over
to the Carter's house to investigate. Collins saw Fisher approach, so he warned
his companions. Thereupon, defendant and Boney threw the stolen items into
the bushes. Fisher then appeared with his shotgun and told the three to stand
against defendant's truck. As Fisher turned to look toward the house for signs
of breaking and entering, defendant yelled to him, "Hold it."18 Fisher immedi-
ately turned around only to be shot five times by defendant. Defendant and his
friends left the scene. Fisher died as a result of the shooting.19
The Wake County Superior Court found defendant guilty of, among other
things, murder in the first degree based on four theories. 20 Three of the theories
13. IMJ at 199, 337 S.E.2d at 523.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 193, 337 S.E.2d at 519-20.
16. Id. at 193, 337 S.E.2d at 520. No mention is made in the opinion of whether force was used
to open the shed or whether the shed was locked. Id. In his brief, defendant pointed out that no
weapon was used to effect the felonies with which he was charged-breaking and entering, and
larceny. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 21, Fields (No. 653A84).
17. Fields, 315 N.C. at 193, 337 S.E.2d at 520.
18. Id. Defendant had a .38-caliber pistol in his waistband and pulled it out at this moment.
Id. His accomplice Collins, however, did not know that defendant had a gun with him. Defendant-
Appellant's Brief at 21.
19. Fields, 315 N.C. at 193, 337 S.E.2d at 520.
20. Record at 1-2, Fields. Defendant was found guilty of
first degree murder (with premeditation and deliberation), first degree murder during the
commission of second degree burglary (felony murder), first degree murder during the
commission of felonious breaking or entering, committed with the use of a deadly weapon
1987]
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were felony murder-murder committed during the perpetration of felonious
breaking and entering, murder committed during the perpetration of felonious
larceny, and murder during the commission of a burglary.2 1
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, defendant Fields argued
that as felonies unspecified in section 14-17, the felonious breaking and entering
and the felonious larceny must have been accomplished with the actual physical
use of a deadly weapon in order to form the basis of a felony murder convic-
tion.22 Defendant contended that the statute required him, for example, to have
used the gun to shoot the lock off the shed, which he did not do.2 3 The court
rejected as unfounded defendant's interpretation of the statute and held that
mere possession of a weapon is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of use.24 The
court explained that the presence of a weapon, though not physically used in the
felony, served a psychological use to defendant. 25 The court pointed out that
the gun "may bolster [defendant's] confidence, steel his nerve, allay fears of his
apprehension. Even under circumstances where the weapon is never used, it
functions as a backup, an inanimate accomplice that can cover for the defendant
if he is interrupted."' 26 The court further explained that the general assembly
did not intend to restrict the felony murder rule as narrowly as defendant in-
sisted and, thus, upheld the superior court's decision.27
An examination of the historical development of the felony murder rule and
of the context giving rise to the North Carolina General Assembly's 1977
amendment will help in understanding why the general assembly limited appli-
cation of the rule. The felony murder rule in the United States is derived from
the English common law.28 At common law, any death which resulted during
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony was prosecuted as mur-
der.29 Prosecution did not require "intent to kill or injure, [nor] an act done in
(felony murder), first degree murder during the commission of felonious larceny, commit-
ted with the use of a deadly weapon (felony murder).
Id. The Fields court upheld all but the felony murder conviction based on second degree burglary.
315 N.C. at 208, 337 S.E.2d at 528. The court found that defendant's activity did not meet the
curtilage test for second degree burglary. Id. at 196, 337 S.E.2d at 521.
21. See Record at 1-2.
22. Fields, 315 N.C. at 198, 199, 337 S.E.2d at 523.
23. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 21.
24. Fields, 315 N.C. at 198, 199, 337 S.E.2d at 523.
25. Id. at 199, 337 S.E.2d at 523.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 198, 200, 337 S.E.2d at 524.
28. Exactly how the rule originated is unknown. For a general discussion of some of the differ-
ent views of the rule's origin, see Roth & Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule" A Doctrine at Constitu-
tional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 449 (1985). For a more detailed discussion of the
possible origin, see People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
29. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 206. For purposes of the felony murder rule,
the phrase "during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony" means there must be a
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the victim's death. Id. at 206 n.l. "[T]he
defendant, by his conduct in committing or attempting the felony, must actually cause the death."
Id.
One court's interpretation of the common-law view of felony murder required that the death be
a consequence of the defendant's commission of the felony, and not merely a coincidence. Common-
wealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 495, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (1958); see also Adlerstein, Felony-Murder in
the New Criminal Codes, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 249, 253 (1976) ("the killing charged must be a conse-
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wanton and wilful disregard of the obvious likelihood of causing such harm."3 0
Moreover, an accomplice could be convicted for a death that resulted from the
actions of a co-felon. 3 1 This concept became known as the felony murder rule.
Because murder was not divided into degrees at common law,32 all convic-
tions were punishable by death. 33 "[A]ny unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought, either express or implied" was deemed murder.34 The
fiction of constructive malice was invoked to place deaths that occurred during
the commission of unlawful acts within the realm of murder statutes. 35 Also at
common law, all felonies were punishable by death. 36 Thus, no distinction was
made as to a particular felony's degree of dangerousness to human life. All
felonies could serve as the basis for application of the felony murder rule.37 Be-
cause the individual punishments for both the murder and the felony were the
same, some commentators have concluded that the purpose of the felony murder
rule at common law was to convict a defendant for a death that resulted in
connection with a failed attempt to commit a felony.3 8 Attempts were punished
as misdemeanors at common law, and thus "use of the felony-murder rule al-
lowed the courts to punish the actor in the same manner as if his attempt had
succeeded." '39
The harsh effects that the broad scope of the felony murder rule could
wreak led English courts to limit the rule's application to crimes in which the
underlying felony was dangerous to human life.4° Eventual dissatisfaction with
the idea of constructive malice led Parliament to abolish the rule in 1957.41
quence of the felonious act"); cf. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 67 (3d ed. 1982) (assert-
ing the requirement that the death occur during the commission or attempted commission of a
felony should be interpreted to mean "but for the felony the deceased would not have been killed").
Thus, proof of a strict causal connection between the felony and the murder was not necessary at
common law. But see infra text accompanying note 50.
30. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 29, at 61. Some authorities have chosen to explain the
rule by stating that the intent to commit the felony was transferred to the killing. See 2 W. LAFAvE
& A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 206 n.2.
31. Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34, 37 (D.C. 1977); cf. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App.
2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939) (felon convicted of murder for the killing of one of his co-felons by another
co-felon).
32. See State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 304, 56 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1949).
33. G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 204 (1978).
34. Streeton, 231 N.C. at 304, 56 S.E.2d at 652 (1949).
35. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 211. Constructive malice is defined as "[i]mplied malice
... ; malice which is not shown by direct proof of an intention to do injury (express malice), but
which is inferentially established by the necessarily injurious results of the acts shown to have been
committed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (5th ed. 1979).
36. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 207 n.4. This fact has led some to question
whether applying the felony murder rule served any purpose since the punishment for both felonies
and murder was death. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
37. See 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 206.
38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, at 31 n.74 (Official Draft 1980).
39. Id.
40. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 29, at 62-63; People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 697-
98, 299 N.W.2d 304, 312 (1980) (discussing British position on the felony murder rule).
41. English Homicide Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § 1 (1) (1957). The statute reads:
Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence, the
killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express
1987]
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Despite England's ultimate disfavor with it, however, the felony murder
rule enjoys continued application in the United States.42 Only four states have
abolished it.43 Nevertheless, the majority of states have limited the scope of
their felony murder statutes. 44
The main reason for restricting application of the rule is to prevent applica-
tion of the harsh punishments that accompany intentional murders in situations
in which the death resulted in connection with one of the numerous felonies that
possesses no inherent danger and creates no reasonable foreseeability of death.45
Another possible reason for limiting the rule may be a general reluctance to treat
as murder a death caused without actual malice or intent.
a6
The limitations imposed by states retaining the felony murder rule have
taken numerous forms. Examples are limitation to common-law felonies, 47 felo-
nies enumerated in a state's statute,48 and felonies inherently dangerous to
or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or
furtherance of another offence.
Id.
42. Several reasons for retention of the rule have been articulated. See generally Roth &
Sundby, supra note 28, at 450-59 (discussing the merits and criticisms of the four most common
reasons: to deter felons from killing negligently or to deter the commission of the felony itself, to
relieve the state of the burden of proving malice by invoking the doctrine of transferred intent; to
ensure retribution for the death that occurred; and to hold the defendant generally culpable for the
results of his or her bad acts).
43. Hawaii and Kentucky legislatively abolished the felony murder rule by requiring that the
killing be intentional. HAW. REv. STAT. § 707.701 (1976); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985). For an excellent discussion of why the Hawaii legislature abolished
the felony murder rule, see HAW. REv. STAT. § 701.701 comment (1976). The Michigan Supreme
Court abolished the rule in a decision that found felony murder was not sanctioned by statute in that
state. See People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980). Ohio has relegated to man-
slaughter the deaths which previously would have fallen under the felony murder statute, and re-
quires intent to kill for a murder conviction. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01 to 2903.04
(Anderson 1987).
44. Only a few states retain the common-law position that any felony can serve as the support
for a felony murder conviction. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (1984) "A person... com-
mits the offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he causes the death of another
human being irrespective of malice." Id. This provision has been construed to encompass all felo-
nies. See Baker v. State, 236 Ga. 754, 758, 225 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1976). For other examples see
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1981) ("any felony"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (1984) ("any fel-
ony"); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 1974) ("a felony," excluding manslaughter); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 940.02 (West 1982) ("a felony").
45. See People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 565, 199 N.W. 373, 374 (1924) (defendant manufac-
tured and sold moonshine-a felony under the statute-so that when a customer of defendant died
as a result of getting drunk and sleeping out in the cold, the court refused to apply the felony murder
rule on grounds that the act of selling the liquor is "not in itself directly and naturally dangerous to
life"); see also 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 207 (If defendant files a false tax return
and the "revenue agent investigating the taxpayer's return should slip on the taxpayer's front steps
and break his neck, the taxpayer ought not to be guilty of murder, though his act in filing a false
return may have been an actual cause of death").
46. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1306-08.
47. See 2 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 1, at 208-11; see also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 29, at 65 (death resulting from statutory rape would be excluded). South Carolina limits
application of its felony murder rule to common-law felonies. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-
op. 1985).
48. See Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law Reconceptualization, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1918, 1919
(1986). Statutes that restrict application of the felony murder rule only to those felonies enumerated
in the statute include: COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-102 (1986); IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (1979);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.003 (Vernon 1979); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1984).
1224 [Vol. 65
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human life.4 9 Other restrictions include the requirement that the underlying
felony be independent of the homicide, that the time period of the commission of
the felony be narrowly construed, and that a causal connection between the fel-
ony and the death be shown.50
Some states treat deaths occurring during the commission of felonies not
mentioned in their first degree murder statutes under their second degree stat-
utes,5 1 and Florida punishes for unenumerated felonies under its third degree
murder statute.5 2 A few states have downgraded felony murder to a second
degree murder offense.5 3 Most states, however, treat all such crimes as a first
degree murder offense.5 4
North Carolina has retained felony murder as a first degree murder offense
in North Carolina General Statutes section 14-17. 55 In 1893, the general assem-
bly divided murder into two degrees.5 6 A killing was punished as first degree
murder if the mode of perpetration was sufficiently heinous.5 7 Felony murder
was regarded as "sufficiently atrocious to be included in the category of first
degree murder."'58
Prior to the 1977 amendment any felony could support a felony murder
conviction in North Carolina.5 9 Nevertheless, some North Carolina decisions
during this time evidenced a growing concern that the rule's scope was too
broad. For example, in State v. Streeton 60 the supreme court recognized that
since the inception of section 14-17,61 many statutory felonies had been created
that "have no natural tendency to cause death and by reason thereof are much
less serious crimes than the common-law felonies giving rise to the felony-mur-
49. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 29, at 65. This requirement has been interpreted
to include a felony which creates a foreseeable danger to human life. 2 W. LAFAvE & A. SCoTr,
supra note 1, at 209. California designates as first degree murder those deaths occurring during the
commission or attempted commission of certain enumerated felonies; other deaths occurring during
the commission or attempted commission of felonies deemed to be inherently dangerous to human
life are treated as second degree murder offenses. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1987).
50. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 700-01, 299 N.W.2d 304, 313 (1980).
51. See, eg., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-16-4, -9 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-
32 to -33 (1982).
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(4) (West Supp. 1987).
53. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110 (1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West 1986);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975 & 1986); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon
1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.02 (West 1982).
54. See Note, supra note 48, at 1919 n.5.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986); see also State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 422, 290 S.E.2d
574, 588 (1982) (emphasizing that North Carolina "recognizes no offense of felony murder in the
second degree").
56. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 85, §§ 1-2, 1893 N.C. Pub. Laws 76, 76 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986)).
57. State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 305, 56 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1949).
58. Id.
59. The statute enumerated a few felonies and then added a catchall phrase. For a statement of
§ 14-17 prior to 1977, see infra note 61.
60. 231 N.C. 301, 56 S.E.2d 649 (1949).
61. When Streeton was decided, § 14-17 read in part: "A murder.., which shall be committed
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall
be deemed to be murder in the first degree .... Act of March 11, 1949, ch. 299, § 1, 1949 N.C.
Sess. Laws 262, 262 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-17 (1986)).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
der rule." 62 Nevertheless, the court refused to determine whether the general
assembly intended the words "other felony" in section 14-1763 to be limited only
to those felonies that were inherently dangerous to human life, or to be extended
to any and all felonies. 64
Twenty-three years later, however, the court settled that issue when it in-
ferred a restriction in the felony murder clause in State v. Thompson.65 In
Thompson the court ruled that the "other felony" language of section 14-1766
contemplated the commission or attempted commission of any felony that cre-
ated a "substantial foreseeable human risk and actually result[s] in the loss of
life."'67 If the common-law requirement of an interrelationship between the fel-
ony and the death was present, the felon could be convicted of felony murder.68
The general assembly officially restricted the felonies that could be the basis
of a felony murder conviction by amending section 14-17 in 1977 to read in part:
"A murder.., which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted per-
petration of any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony com-
mitted or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be
murder in the first degree." 69 In State v. Wall 70 and State v. Avery 71 the
supreme court had the opportunity to apply the new language "other felony
committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon .... ." Defendant in
Wall committed the felony of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle.
72
The Avery court upheld the conviction of a defendant who used firebombs in the
perpetration of the felony of attempting to burn a building used for trade.73 The
court determined that the firebombs were deadly weapons within the purview of
section 14-17. 74 Both cases involved actual physical use of a deadly weapon in
perpetration of the underlying felony. Thus, the court was not required to deter-
mine what the word "use" entailed under the statute.
62. Streeton, 231 N.C. at 305, 56 S.E.2d at 652-53. See also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra
note 29, at 14-15 (noting that many modem felonies were only misdemeanors at common law).
63. See supra note 61.
64. Streeton, 231 N.C. at 305, 56 S.E.2d at 653. Defendant in Streeton was convicted of first
degree murder for the shooting death of his kidnapping victim. Although kidnapping was not one of
the four named felonies in § 14-17, see supra note 61, the court deemed that it came within the
"other felony" language of the statute because kidnapping for ransom is "a felony which has a
natural tendency to cause death." Streeton, 231 N.C. at 306, 56 S.E.2d at 653.
65. 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
66. For the pertinent text of § 14-17 in effect at the time Thompson was decided, see supra note
61.
67. Thompson, 280 N.C. at 211, 185 S.E.2d at 672. Like defendant in Fields, defendant in
Thompson was convicted of murder for the shooting death of his victim in the commission of feloni-
ous breaking and entering and felonious larceny. The court concluded that these felonies came
within the scope of the "other felony" language of § 14-17 because they were committed while
defendant was armed with a pistol, a circumstance that "created substantial foreseeable human
risks." Id. at 212, 185 S.E.2d at 673.
68. Id.
69. Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 407, 407 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986)).
70. 304 N.C. 609, 286 S.E.2d 68 (1982).
71. 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985).
72. Wall, 304 N.C. at 612, 286 S.E.2d at 71.
73. Avery, 315 N.C. at 26, 337 S.E.2d at 800.
74. Id.
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In dictum in State v. Davis75 the court expounded on the implications of the
"'use" language in section 14-17. Essentially, the Davis court viewed the 1977
amendment as a limitation on the broad applications of the felony murder rule
as construed in Streeton and Thompson.76 The Davis court emphasized that the
defendant is required to have used a deadly weapon during his criminal activ-
ity.7 7 Nevertheless, like the Avery and Wall cases, the Davis facts did not com-
pel the court to construe the meaning of "use" under the statute.
A few other jurisdictions have wording in their statutes that is similar to the
"use" language of North Carolina's felony murder clause. For example, New
Hampshire's statute authorizes a first degree murder conviction if the defendant
caused the death of a person during the "commission of, or while attempting to
commit robbery or burglary while armed with a deadly weapon, the death being
caused by the use of such weapon."'78 Research reveals no New Hampshire case
that specifically construes the word "use" in the statute. The logical interpreta-
tion of the statute, however, is that the defendant can be convicted of felony
murder for mere possession of a deadly weapon while committing or attempting
to commit the felony so long as the weapon is used to perpetrate the death.
Another statute which deals with possession is the District of Columbia's
first degree murder statute.7 9 Under that statute, a person can be convicted of
felony murder for "perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any housebreaking
while armed with or using a dangerous weapon."' 80 An even more specific stat-
ute is found in Connecticut. In that state, a defendant can be convicted of felony
murder for a death that occurred during "sexual assault in the first degree with a
75. 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982). Defendant in Davis was convicted of first degree
murder after the jury found premeditation, deliberation, and malice aforethought. Felony murder
was raised by defendant on appeal questioning whether the lower court erred by not instructing the
jury on second degree felony murder. Second degree murder conviction requires intent and malice,
but not premeditation and deliberation. Because defendant intentionally killed his victim after per-
petrating the felony of burglary, he believed that a lesser charge of second degree felony murder
should have been made. The court responded that there is no offense of second degree felony murder
in North Carolina. Id. at 402-22, 290 S.E.2d at 574-88.
76. Id. at 423, 290 S.E.2d at 588.
77. The court stated,
As can readily be seen from the face of the statute, murders commonly referred to as
"felony murders" now include killings occurring during the commission or attempted com-
mission of a felony with the use of a deadly weapon and killings occurring during the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of the specified felonies ...without regard to
whether these specified felonies were perpetrated or attempted with the use of a deadly
weapon. All such murders are deemed by the statute to be murder in the first degree.
Conversely, killings occurring during the commission or attempted commission of a felony
not committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon and not one of the felonies
specified in the statute are.., not murder in either the first or second degree.
If the State is to carry its burden of proof on a charge of murder in cases in which a
killing occurs during the commission of a felony committed or attempted without the use
of a deadly weapon and not one of the felonies specified in the statute, it must show that the
killing was murder as at common law by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that it was an
intentional and unlawful killing with malice aforethought.
Id. at 424-25, 290 S.E.2d at 589.
78. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:l-a(I)(b)(2) (1986).
79. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2401 (1981).
80. Id.
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firearm."81 "With a firearm" means that defendant can be convicted if he or she
"uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his
words or conduct that he possesses a deadly weapon."'82 Thus, if the weapon is
not used to actually perpetrate the felony, then it must be used in some other
way, apart from killing the victim.8 3
To the extent that it does not expressly require that the weapon be used to
actually commit the felony, section 14-17 is like these three statutes. Otherwise,
the statutes in these jurisdictions are easily distinguishable from North Caro-
lina's statute. The New Hampshire and District of Columbia statutes both ex-
pressly provide for conviction on the ground of mere possession of a deadly
weapon because a defendant "armed with" a deadly weapon can be guilty of
felony murder.84 In Connecticut, the felon must do more than merely possess a
deadly weapon; he must use the weapon in some way.85 For example, the felon
could be convicted if he or she brandishes the weapon in front of a victim.86
Thus, these statutes leave no room for ambiguity. The inclusion of the clear
alternative "or armed with" leaves no doubt that mere possession, and the psy-
chological use inherent therein, is enough. It is not necessary to stretch the
word "use" in these statutes to mean more than actual physical use.
The felony murder clause in section 14-17, however, leaves much to be
desired. The supreme court has repeatedly stated that the 1977 amendment was
meant to restrict the scope of the rule,87 and to do away with the nebulous
standards courts had begun to use to construe the rule.8 8 Yet the Fields court
interpreted the statute as contemplating psychological use.89 This interpretation
leaves the statute broad enough to allow the harsh results that the general as-
sembly intended to prevent with the amendment. Thus, if Fisher had suffered a
fatal heart attack when defendant Fields ordered him to "hold it," then under
the Fields rationale, defendant would be guilty of felony murder-defendant's
psychological use of his gun would place him within the statute's purview. The
Fields opinion implies that the only felonies which the general assembly intended
to omit are those committed without the presence of a deadly weapon.
Arguably, the general assembly did not intend to reduce drastically the
scope of the rule with the 1977 amendment. But in light of the specificity of
similar statutes in other jurisdictions, 90 the logical conclusion is that if the
North Carolina General Assembly had intended the word "use" to include the
psychological use inherent in the possession of a deadly weapon, it would have
81. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54c (West 1985).
82. Id. §§ 53a-70a.
83. See State v. DiBattista, 110 Conn. 549, 559, 148 A. 664, 668 (1930) (weapon must be used
"either for the purpose of personal injury to [the victim] or to put him in fear").
84. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
86, DiBattista, 110 Conn. at 559, 148 A. at 668 (1930).
87. See, eg., Fields, 315 N.C. at 199, 337 S.E.2d at 523; Davis, 305 N.C. at 423, 290 S.E.2d at
588.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67 & 76.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
90. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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included sufficiently specific language in its amendment of section 14-17 to con-
vey that intent clearly.
Not even the prosecution in Fields foresaw the feasibility of arguing that
mere possession of a weapon was sufficient "psychological use" to satisfy the
requirement of the statute. Instead, the prosecution invoked common-law fel-
ony murder principles to argue that actual use of the weapon to effectuate the
felony was not required so long as an interrelationship between the felony and
the death by that particular weapon existed.91
The Wall court asserted that the 1977 amendment was unambiguous on its
face.92 It pointed out that when there is no ambiguity, "there is no room for
judicial construction, and the courts must give the statute its plain meaning."19 3
That court, however, was not presented with the issue of what use was sufficient,
and did not discuss psychological use. Nevertheless, it gave no indication it
would have construed the statute to require anything less than actual physical
use of a deadly weapon to effectuate a felony.
The Fields court faced the issue of psychological use of a weapon as one of
first impression in North Carolina. Defendant pointed out the latent ambiguity
in the "committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon" language in
section 14-17.94 Again, the court refused to determine that the language was
ambiguous. The word "use" has been defined broadly enough to include "psy-
chological use." '9 5 But to find that the general assembly intended the language
to include psychological use is to defeat the legislature's attempt to restrict the
scope of the rule.96 As discussed earlier,97 simple addition of such words as
"armed with" or "merely possesses" would have been present if the legislature
intended possession and psychological use to suffice for a felony murder
conviction.
It is once again up to the general assembly to amend the felony murder
clause of section 14-17, because ambiguity is apparent in the present statement
of the rule. Intention to restrict application of the felony murder rule could be
conveyed in one of two ways. First, if the legislature intended to restrict the
scope of the rule to felonies committed with the actual use of a weapon, it could
amend the felony murder portion of the statute to read "or other felony commit-
ted or attempted and effectuated or attempted to be effectuated by utilizing a
deadly weapon." Alternatively, the amendment could read "or other felony ac-
91. Brief for the State at 15-16, Fields. The felony need not be the proximate cause of the death
to qualify as the "interrelationship." Id. For other interpretations of the common-law requirement
for a felony murder conviction see supra note 29.
92. Wall, 304 N.C. at 615, 286 S.E.2d at 72. Defendant in Wall objected to conviction under
the felony murder rule and argued that the legislature, through the 1977 amendment to § 14-17,
"did not intend that the discharging of a firearm into occupied property be included as an underlying
felony for the purposes of the felony murder rule." Id. at 614, 286 S.E.2d at 72.
93. Id. at 615, 286 S.E.2d at 72.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
95. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1382 (5th ed. 1979) ("The 'use' of a thing means that one
is to enjoy, hold, occupy, or have some manner of benefit thereof. Use also means usefulness, utility,
advantage, productive of benefit.").
96. See supra text accompanying notes 60-68.
97. See supra text following note 86.
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tually committed or attempted with physical use of a deadly weapon." Second,
if the legislature intended only that a causal connection exist between the felony
and the death caused by the defendant's weapon, the amendment could read "or
other felony committed or attempted and a deadly weapon is utilized." The
word "and" in this proposed amendment makes the statute sufficiently broad to
include both felonies actually effectuated with the use of a deadly weapon and
deaths which occurred by use of a deadly weapon that are causally connected to
the felony.
Even if the general assembly did intend psychological use of a weapon for
suffice for a felony murder conviction, a revision in the present statutory lan-
guage is necessary to prevent futile arguments of ambiguity from arising. An
amendment that phrases the statute along the lines of the New Hampshire, Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Connecticut statutes9" would better convey this intent.
ELIZABETH KELLY
98. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
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